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Strategizing in a focused context: managerial discretion in the Arab world 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Managerial discretion, which stands for the latitude of strategic actions (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987), has almost achieved its pearl jubilee of resolving the debate between two 
schools of thoughts. On the one hand, population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977), 
contingency theory (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), resource dependence (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978), bureaucratic limitations (Blau and Scott, 1962) and neo-institutionalism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) postulate evidence asserting that executives are constrained in 
the way they take strategic choices due to isomorphic, environmental, inertial and relentless 
forces. On the other hand, work on executive effects (e.g. Hambrick and Quigley, 2014), 
classic management (e.g. Andrews, 1971) and upper echelons (e.g. Hambrick and Mason, 
1984) provide contrasting outputs emphasizing the fundamental importance of top managers 
in shaping and influencing organizations’ outcomes. This has triggered a new stream of 
research that began to examine the various constructs of managerial discretion. 
Discretion antecedents vary from micro to macro levels. On a personal level, 
executive individualities including locus of control, commitment to the status quo, age, 
tenure, education and risk taking behavior were identified as proxies of discretion (e.g. 
Carpenter and Golden, 1997; McClelland et al., 2010; Miller et al., 1982; Roth, 1992). On 
another level, organizational factors also exhibited significant influence on shaping the 
degree of managerial discretion. Out of these factors are: organizational and board structure 
(e.g. Kim, 2013; Quigley and Hambrick, 2012), ownership structure (e.g. Werner and Tosi, 
1995), culture (e.g. Key, 2002), strategic orientation (e.g. Boyd and Salamin, 2001), capital 
intensity and resource availability (Wangrow et al., 2015). At a macro level, industry 
antecedents were the focus of majority of scholars who have assessed the impact of 
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regulatory conditions, market growth, product differentiability and industry’s capital intensity 
along with demand instability on executives’ discretion (e.g. Datta and Rajagopalan, 1998; 
Finkelstein, 2009; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick and Quigley, 2014; Keegan 
and Kabanoff, 2008; Magnan and St-Onge, 1997; Peteraf and Reed, 2007). 
Though, very little work has considered the impact of national institutions on 
managerial discretion. Only recently, discretion has been examined on a national-level 
(Crossland and Hambrick, 2011) by accentuating the impact of cultural values including: 
individualism, uncertainty tolerance, power distance and cultural looseness on CEOs’ 
discretion of public firms headquartered in several OECD countries. This national-level 
paradigm represents an important contribution to the discretion field. However, the current 
discretion research reflects an excessively narrow view of the external environment. Despite, 
Crossland and Hambrick (2007, 2011) attempts, considerable opportunity still exists to 
examine the country-level characters that could affect executives’ discretion. The current 
status of such fundamental dimension is similar to what Sonpar and Golden-Biddle (2008) 
denote as ‘adolescent’, i.e. not yet fully developed and validated. Wangrow and colleagues 
(2015) in their review of empirical studies on managerial discretion called for a better 
conceptualization of the theory and particularly urged researchers to directly assess and test 
the validity of the discretion constructs. Thus, unless researchers define, validate and directly 
measure discretion without solely relying on previous indicators, advancement in its 
theoretical development will be restricted. This motivated us to fill in the wide gap that 
remains in the national-level construct of discretion. National environment possesses various 
factors that could play a significant role in shaping executives’ discretion. Few studies have 
considered the relationship between a confined domain of leadership (e.g. CEO discretion) 
and other national-level factors. We incorporate such consideration by empirically integrating 
the effect of cultural practices on CEOs’ discretion using a contemporary cross-cultural 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 C
ov
en
try
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
7:
21
 2
4 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
7 
(P
T)
  
model, the GLOBE (House et al., 2004). Furthermore, the discretion research has strongly 
focused on US and Western contexts without taking into account other countries’ 
characteristics. Referring to the cross-cultural literature, culturally distant collectives might 
not recognize, appreciate or validate the effect of national institutions on executives’ 
discretion. Out of the 45 articles reviewed in Wangrow and colleagues’ (2015) study, only 
four examined the antecedents of managerial discretion and only one endeavor has examined 
discretion at the national-level. More importantly, a handful of other studies have directly 
assessed and measured managerial discretion. This dearth of research significantly diminishes 
our understanding of how several internal and external factors influence executives’ latitude 
of actions. Thus, we are attempting to fill in the holes by providing a more concrete set of 
managerial discretion antecedents. By focusing on the national-level, we explicitly examine 
the impact of a wide range of cultural practices. Yet, we are assessing the validity of 
Crossland and Hambrick (2011) findings; we also scrutinize the impact of other cultural 
dimensions that have not been considered in earlier studies. 
Therefore, building on institutional theory, we examine the context dependency of 
managerial discretion construct by assessing the impact of cultural practices of several 
Middle Eastern countries on CEOs’ discretion. In short, our paper seeks to identify new 
national-level antecedents of managerial discretion. We anticipate that our paper provides 
several contributions to this growing and important field of research. Unlike prior research 
that merely investigated the national-context, our study emphasizes the importance of this 
macro construct as a crucial determinant of executives’ discretion. We extend the 
development of the national-level dimension by discovering several important societal 
practices that act as strong enablers/restrictors of managerial discretion. Contrary to prior 
findings (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011), we emphasize the importance of societal hierarchy 
labeled as power distance to be a fundamental enabler of CEOs’ latitude of actions. Our work 
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helps to broaden the understanding on various cross-cultural business phenomena related to 
executives’ behavior. For instance, CEOs’ compensation, which was examined in the 
literature as an outcome of managerial discretion, showed interesting cross-cultural 
variations. UK and US CEOs’ receive higher incentive-based compensation as opposed to 
their counter-parts in Japan and South Korea (Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004). Also, CEO 
accountability (Crossland and Chen, 2013) and executives’ departure rates (Lucier et al., 
2005) were evidence of cross-cultural variation in executives’ status and behavior. Such 
phenomena could be better understood by considering and widening the range of national-
level antecedents of discretion. 
Our paper reaches its desired contribution by adopting the following structure. In the 
next section, using institutional theory, we build our theoretical model of why how culture 
impacts CEO discretion. We also introduce our main arguments and develop a number of 
research hypotheses. In the following section, we provide a description of and justification 
for: our sample, discretion, cultural measures and the analytical technique employed to test 
our propositions. Following that, we present and discuss our findings. Finally, we highlight 
the contributions of our work and its implication for theory and practice. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Institutional theory focuses attention on the dependence of firms on the environment. 
Institutions are the humanly invented restrictions that arrange social interaction, political and 
economic activities (North, 1990). Scott (2001, p. 49) defined institutions as “multifaceted, 
durable social structures made up of symbolic elements, social activities and material 
recourses”. Most definitions portray institutions as robust social assemblies that direct human 
behavior and help to reduce uncertainty.  In order to maintain such orderliness and to reduce 
uncertainty, institutions exert constraints on various societal members (Nelson and Nelson, 
2002). National cultures are one of the important institutional constraints that pose strong 
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influence on organizations. Hofstede (1980, p. 25) referred to national cultures as the 
“collective programing of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group 
from another”. National culture through normative and institutional pressures significantly 
shapes organizational actions, and acts as a moderator for management practices (Hofstede, 
1993). Similarly, Huang and Van De Vliert (2003) argue that national culture exerts 
substantial weights on individuals’ actions. Executives of firms operating in a particular 
country are subject to the pressure imposed by that country’s national culture. Because, 
countries differ in their culture, the degree of constraints of those societal norms varies from 
one country to another (Davis et al., 1997). In this vein, the degree of respect, status, 
privilege and influence accorded to leaders will correspondingly fluctuate across cultures 
(House el al., 2004). Culture in its core sense is the general homogeneity that characterizes 
some group/s and differs between them. It is a combination of institutions, norms and values 
that govern how societies interact or manage exchanges (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 
1998). Culture exerts informal constraints related to taboos, traditions, customs, sanctions and 
code of conduct (North, 1991). These informal controls are the “socially shared rules, usually 
unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside official sanctioned channels” 
(Helmke and Levitsky, 2006, p. 5). 
Our paper is based on the premise that national culture is likely to play a crucial role 
in shaping the degree of leeway executives have. Going back to the roots of managerial 
discretion, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) argued that executives possess discretion if their 
actions fall within stakeholder’s zone of acceptance (in this case societal culture) and the 
relative power of these stakeholders to object deviant actions. Building on the former 
condition, executives are faced with environmental constraints if their actions fall outside of 
society’s zone of acceptance. If executives implement actions that infringe the acceptable 
practices within a particular society, these actions will be perceived as objectionable. The 
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perception of unacceptability of a certain action is a function of the prevailing societal norms 
(national culture). As such, societies that differ in their cultural norms will respectively differ 
in perceiving actions as objectionable. In other words, actions that are deemed acceptable in 
some societies may well be observed as obnoxious in others. There are indications that 
national cultural variations have strong influence on executive departure rates (Lucier et al., 
2005), CEO strategic motivations (Witt and Redding, 2009) and CEO effect on firm 
performance (Crossland and Hambrick, 2007). In this vein, Crossland and Hambrick (2011) 
assessed the impact of culture on CEO discretion in several OECD countries. They 
operationalized national culture using three societal norms: individualism, uncertainty 
tolerance and power distance. Findings show that individualism and uncertainty tolerance are 
positively related to CEO discretion; however, power distance is negatively associated 
(Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). Other investigations showed the moderating effect of 
managerial discretion on CEO accountability across several countries. Crossland and Chen 
(2013) found that in countries characterized by higher discretion, CEOs’ dismissal 
probability due to poor performance increases. Such findings illustrate the importance of 
managerial discretion to explain various organizational phenomena. However, before moving 
towards the end of the spectrum (studying the consequences of discretion), there is a constant 
need to provide validity of the antecedents/sources of this construct. In order to have mature 
theory, researchers should provide empirical support for earlier propositions. Our goal in this 
paper is to delineate the national-level foundations of managerial discretion in order to 
validate its conceptualization and provide construct clarity, which is essential for achieving a 
mature theory (Bacharach, 1989). Therefore, building on this logic, we investigate the effect 
of a broader set of cultural norms on CEO discretion operating in new cross-cultural context. 
In doing so, we discuss in details the mechanisms in which cultural practices influence the 
degree of managerial discretion provided to CEOs’ headquartered in these countries.  
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Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Institutional Collectivism 
Individualism and collectivism have been heavily studied in the literature of national culture 
and cross-cultural studies (House et al., 2004; Segall and Kagitcibasi, 1997). People in 
individualistic societies tend to favour: self-goals, autonomous actions, personal needs and 
rational behavior as opposed to their counterparts in collectivistic environments in which they 
tend to be more: integrated within groups, favour collective behavior and follow a consensus-
based decision-making (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; Smith et al., 1996). Such practice 
is reflected into organizational behavior in terms of human resource practices, motivation, job 
satisfaction, accountability, job attitudes, etc. (House et al., 2004). But more important is its 
implication in relation to leadership. Ali and colleagues (1997) argued that Kuwaiti 
executives possess stronger attitude towards participative and consultative decision-making 
due to their high emphasis on collectivism. In contrast, in the United States, a highly 
individualistic culture, leaders’ cognitive base is more independent, forceful and strong 
willed (Dorfman, 1998), which reflects their cultural foundation. Thus, in individualistic 
cultures, leaders act in an autonomous way, follow task accomplishment without relying on 
group harmony and emphasize individual discretion (Erez and Earley, 1993; Hofstede and 
Bond, 1988; Triandis, 1993). Such societies provide a wider ‘zone of acceptance’ for 
executives to idiosyncratically take unilateral decisions, and have greater leeway in deciding 
the future of their organizations (Crossland and Hambrick, 2007). On the other hand, 
collective cultures do not tolerate individual initiatives. That being said, executives 
experience high latitude of actions if their society encourages and accepts unilateral, 
autonomous and idiosyncratic behavior. Following Crossland and Hambrick (2011) 
proposition, we posit that collectivist countries impose greater constraints on CEOs’ to take 
consensus-based decisions in which their own interpretation and choices would not be 
considered important. Thus: 
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H1: Institutional collectivism has a negative and significant relationship with managerial 
discretion. 
Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Uncertainty Avoidance 
Initially used as an organizational phenomenon, uncertainty avoidance relates to the extent to 
which ambiguity is tolerated within a society (House et al., 2004). In other words, some 
environments consider ambiguous events or unpredictable actions as a threat and thus prefer 
rules and orders to uncontrolled situations. By employing conventions, rituals, rules and 
orders people in high uncertainty avoidance societies try to minimize unpredictability 
(Hofstede, 2001). Sully de Luque and Javidan (2004) argued that people in countries 
characterized by high uncertainty avoidance tend to be resistant to change, more risk averse, 
and intolerant of rule breaking. In such societies, stakeholders would have less tolerance for 
unconventional, risky and unexpected actions from executives, which would make it difficult 
for executives to take bold initiatives that carry substantial ambiguity and risk. Instead 
executives would be expected to take incremental actions involving less risk and 
unpredictability. In contrast, societies low on uncertainty avoidance are more malleable to 
accept radical, uncertain, dramatic and means-end ambiguity actions (Crossland and 
Hambrick, 2011). In such countries, people are more tolerant to change and are characterized 
to be more risk takers. Thus, when faced with unpredictable situations, executives will have 
wider array of actions to choose from in order to face such ambiguity. Crossland and 
Hambrick (2011) found that CEOs’ of firms headquartered in countries scoring low on 
uncertainty avoidance (based on cultural values) possess higher levels of discretion as 
opposed to their equivalents in high uncertainty avoidance environments. Accordingly, we 
argue that: 
H2: Uncertainty avoidance has a negative and significant relationship with managerial 
discretion. 
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Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Power Distance.  
Some cultural values indicate society’s tolerance for inequality or power distribution (Carl et 
al., 2004). These values include hierarchy (Schwartz, 1994), achievement aspiration 
(Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1998), moral discipline (Chinese Culture Connection, 
1987) and power distance (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004). In the context of this 
research, the author is interested in the latter norm concerning power distance, which is 
another fundamental cultural dimension. Despite being more reflective of the acceptance of 
inequality in a certain society (Hofstede, 2001), it is also suggestive of the status and role of 
leaders within societies (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). Power distance is the norm that 
relates to the social dimension that ratifies and acknowledges power distinction, status, 
honors and authority (House et al., 2004). Meindl et al. (1985) tackled the concept of 
“Romance of Leadership” in which they argued that the attribution perspective that views 
leadership as a symbol and associates positive and negative outcomes to it results in giving 
greater status and profile to leaders. Similarly, Meindl and Ehrlich (1987) showed that 
performance evaluation is stronger when outcomes are attributed to leadership factors, which 
reinforces the phenomenological value of leadership. In other words, society itself provides 
different lenses through which leaders are viewed; in some societies, people romanticize 
leaders and in others they do not. Overall, this research stream (e.g. Meindl et al., 1985; 
Meindl and Ehrlich, 1987; Chen and Meindl, 1991) emphasizes that some societies strongly 
attribute outcomes (either positive or negative) to leaders. In this sense, and because of the 
culturally contingent base of attribution (Krull et al., 1999), leaders in those countries are 
seen as having higher power distance and a greater profile. 
In general, leadership has been seen as widely influential across countries where some 
of the leadership characteristics are deemed universal. For instance, charismatic leadership is 
considered to be a universal feature of successful leadership (Den Hartog et al., 1999). 
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However, despite such universalism of characteristics, leaders and their status are viewed 
distinctly across countries. Particularly, leaders’ status, role or powers within certain societies 
vary significantly from one country to another (House and Javidan, 2004). In some societies, 
leaders are privileged and highly respected for their power and status, which leads them to 
have a greater influence on their followers and provides them with a wider array of available 
actions (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011; House et al., 2004). For instance, Adsit et al. (1997) 
found that in high power distance countries, employees are reluctant to challenge their 
managers and are more likely to follow them, even in the case of disagreement. In other 
words, in these societies, leaders are considered to possess a greater degree of discretion. In 
contrast, in countries that do not promote such privileges, leaders’ actions can come under 
scrutiny and they are faced with higher constraints (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). In these 
environments, leaders tend to have low levels of discretion and are seen as figureheads or 
facilitators rather than as empowered decision makers (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). 
However, Crossland and Hambrick (2011) did not find any significant positive 
relationship between power distance and CEO discretion; in contrast, they found a negative 
relationship. This means that low discretion countries could stress the symbolic role of 
leaders, which provides them with some degree of elevated status (Crossland and Hambrick, 
2011). However, there is no empirical support for such an argument despite some scholars 
considering a constitutional monarch as a real illustration of this relationship (Rose and 
Kavanagh, 1976). Also, due to the sampling and countries being studied in Crossland and 
Hambrick’s (2011) work, the relationship between discretion and power distance was not 
salient; this might not be the case if the sample of countries was extended. Accordingly, the 
author reinforces the positive relationship between power distance and discretion. Therefore, 
the researcher argues that in societies characterized by higher power distance, leaders are 
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more romanticized, have greater acceptance from stakeholders and as such possess greater 
degree of discretion as opposed to leaders in low power distance societies. 
H3: Power distance has a positive and significant relationship with managerial discretion. 
Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Future Orientation 
Future orientation is the cultural dimension that characterizes societies in which individuals 
tend to plan for the future and delay current gratification (House et al., 1999). Put simply, it is 
the norm, which emphasizes future planned behavior. Societies high on future orientation 
tend to have greater sense of time urgency and time is a crucial parameter for various events. 
In essence, time offers differentiated temporal frames that give order, meaning and coherence 
to objects, events and experiences within a certain societal environment. In contrast, 
collectives low on future orientation are more lenient towards enjoying current moments or 
solving current problems without having the willingness to plan for long-term goals (House 
et al., 2004). As such, individuals try to avoid future anxiety and rely on their past 
experiences. By doing so, they will be maintaining their status quo (House et al., 2004; 
Keough et al., 1999). Commitment to the status quo increases the belief of the correctness of 
current practices and lowers the tendency for change. In discretion terms, commitment to the 
status quo has showed negative relationship with managerial discretion (e.g. McClelland et 
al., 2010). Additionally, future orientation allows greater tolerance for innovation (House et 
al., 2004). Thus, it provides executives with a wider array of actions to be implemented. 
Executives operating in countries with low future orientation are more constrained in their 
strategic actions. On the other hand, countries with high future orientation are more interested 
in planning for long-term goals and willing to foresee those goals. In such societies, 
shareholders tend to embrace future return on their investments regardless of the means that 
have been adopted to accomplish those results. Here, CEOs’ can formulate strategies from a 
variety of options where time does not act as a constraint facing their actions. Therefore: 
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H4: Future orientation has a positive and significant relationship with managerial discretion 
Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Humane Orientation 
Humane orientation relates to the level of which a society promotes thoughtful, caring, 
generous, friendly, kindness and fairness values among society members (House et al., 1999). 
These individual norms represent salient motivational factors that direct people’s behavior. 
The more benevolence, love and care they show to each other the more they are considered as 
humane oriented (Triandis, 1995). In these collectives, paternalism plays a crucial role in 
determining the behavior of people (James et al., 1996; Kanungo and Aycan, 1997). People 
in possession of power tend to act as parents for their subordinates, care about their personal 
problems, offer help and have informal relationships with them (House et al., 2004). In other 
words, executives in humane oriented societies are more indulgent with their employees and 
care about their own personal problems. Any decisions, such as cutting jobs, that could affect 
them or any of their relatives (as part of the community) would be discarded. In this vein, 
society exerts strong pressures on executives to act in favour of the whole collective. On the 
other extreme, some societies encourage self-fulfillment, material possessions, self-interest, 
pleasure and power as the dominating factors that motivate individuals’ behavior (House et 
al., 2004). House and colleagues (2004) argue that when the humane orientation increases, 
the overall society become more collectivistic. In other words, solidarity, benevolence and 
altruism go hand in hand with promoting collectivism. Thus, executives are constrained in the 
latitude of actions they can take, implementing bold and turnaround strategies are not 
favoured in such environments. In contrast, countries low on humane orientation, are more 
acceptable of eccentric and bold actions. That being said, humane orientation and managerial 
discretion are negatively related. Consequently: 
H5: Humane orientation has a negative and significant relationship with managerial 
discretion 
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Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Performance Orientation 
Performance orientation refers to the reward for innovation, performance improvement and 
high standards (House et al., 2004). In countries high on performance orientation, judgment 
or evaluation is solely based on results/outcomes. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) stated 
that CEOs’ effect on companies’ performance go hand in hand with the degree of discretion 
they have. This proposition has been supported by several empirical studies that showed the 
moderating role of managerial discretion (e.g. Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). Also, CEO 
dismissal has been considered to be a result of poor performance only in high discretion 
countries (Crossland and Chen, 2013). In that sense, judging CEOs’ based on their 
performance would be mediated by managerial discretion. As such, in high performance 
orientated countries, CEOs’ are explicitly judged based on their performance. Another 
important characteristic of the performance-oriented society is the belief that individuals are 
in control of the events happening in their lives (locus of control). Locus of control represents 
individuals’ ambitions, higher standards for performance and thirst for advancement 
(Hofstede and Bond, 1988; Rotter, 1966). Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) argued 
that individuals from the US tend to be in control of their lives and people in Venezuela are 
otherwise. Such distinction represents the variance of the degree of locus of control across 
societies. In the same vein, internal CEOs’ (in control) were found to foresee risk taking, 
innovative strategies (Miller et al., 1982), generate higher performance (Anderson and 
Schneier, 1978), be more task oriented (Miles and Snow, 1978) and perceive greater 
discretion (Carpenter and Golden, 1997); all of which describe cultural characteristics of high 
performance oriented society. Moreover, performance-based compensation has been 
significantly and positively associated with greater discretion (e.g. Boyd and Salamin, 2001; 
Rajagopalan, 1997; Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992). This financial reward also represents 
an important norm appreciated in countries high on performance orientation (House et al., 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 C
ov
en
try
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
7:
21
 2
4 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
7 
(P
T)
  
2004). In such societies, CEOs’ are able to implement a wider array of strategic actions. 
Accordingly: 
H6: Performance orientation has a positive and significant relationship with managerial 
discretion 
Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Gender Egalitarianism 
“Societies that are relatively unconcerned with demarcating men from women are less 
common than those concerned with affirming men’s’ masculinity” (Coltrane, 1992, p. 88). 
One of the most distinguished ways in which societies differ is through their acceptance of 
gender equality. Each society prescribes and proscribes various roles for men and women 
(Hofstede, 1998). Societies appreciating gender equality try to minimize gender role 
differences, whereas others try to increase the gap between genders (House et al., 1999). 
Masculine countries showed greater achievement motivation and tend to follow a boldness 
style of management (Triandis, 1994). Such societies appreciate independent behavior over 
honoring moral obligations and encourage success and competition over nurturance and 
solidarity (Doney, Canoon and Mullen, 1998). Organizations operating in such cultural 
environment provide unequal opportunities for men and women particularly in the upper 
echelons and encourage results over processes and more importantly an adversarial decision-
making over negotiation and consensus (Erez, 1994). In that sense, executives are allowed to 
take quantum rather than incremental strategic initiatives. In organizational words, executive 
will have more ‘technical discretion’ (Caza, 2012). Furthermore, discretion is a function of 
managers’ degree of risk tolerance. Executives with high discretion are characterized to be 
more risk takers (Roth, 1992). Also, environments that encourage risk-taking behavior tend to 
provide greater degree of managerial discretion (Makhija and Stewart, 2002). Deeming that 
into consideration, women or female CEOs’ exhibited to take strategic actions that do not 
embrace any risk (Bernasek and Shwiff, 2001). In a study of CEO gender effect on firm 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 C
ov
en
try
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
7:
21
 2
4 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
7 
(P
T)
  
performance, Khan and Vieito (2013) argued that when a female CEO leads firm; the risk 
levels are much smaller than companies headed by male CEOs’. Because of that, female 
CEOs’ are inclined to choose from a narrow set of alternative actions when faced with risky 
situations, whereas their male counterparts are able to foresee a broader range of alternatives. 
In comparison to male CEOs’, female executives are given less power in their hierarchical 
position (Muller-Kahle and Schiehll, 2013). As such, power, which is a fundamental element 
that enhances managerial discretion, is lacking when females achieve the CEO position. Due 
to gender stereotypes, female CEOs’ are not able to take idiosyncratic actions that deviate 
from the common acceptable behavior, and more importantly they cannot take strategic 
actions that could harm their atmosphere. Females are nurturance, tender and kind in nature; 
they could hardly take actions that harm other societal members. When aggregated to the 
societal level, such characteristics will significantly coerce CEOs’ actions. As a result, we 
hypothesize that: 
H7: Gender egalitarianism has a negative and significant relationship with managerial 
discretion. 
Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Assertiveness 
Assertiveness refers to the level of which people within a certain society tend to be forceful, 
dominant, tough and aggressive in their relationships with other (House et al., 1999). Such 
norm emphasizes the importance to explicitly exhibit the self or own desire and opinions 
(Booream and Flowers, 1978). Assertive individuals are more suited to reach higher 
hierarchical positions compared to their nonassertive counterparts (Judge et al., 1999). This is 
because individuals in the upper echelon show more forceful and self-confident behavior 
(Fagenson, 1990; House et al., 2004). Assertive countries tend to appreciate competition and 
competitive behavior over cooperation (House et al., 2004). Competitiveness exists in 
countries that implement a free-market economy in which the support is for firms’ 
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competition and individual decisions (North, 1990; Reed, 2001). In this vein, Makhija and 
Stewart (2002) found that executives in free-market economies (e.g. US) have greater sense 
of power towards decision outcomes, are more comfortable with uncertainty and perceive 
further outcome accountability. In other words, in free-market economies, executives tend to 
possess greater level of discretion. Additionally, in the US, a high discretion country, people 
believe in competition (Kohn, 1986), which is the crucial feature of the human nature (Bonta, 
1997). Hence, societies that appreciate competition provide CEOs’ with higher degree of 
discretion. Furthermore, in assertive cultures, people tend to use ‘low-context’ language, 
which refers to the use of explicit, clear and direct speeches (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997). 
The way individuals interpret and see their world is reflected in the language they use 
(Whorf, 1956). When individuals use direct language, they create impressions to others about 
their own opinion and how powerful they perceive their logic. As such, by using ‘impression 
management’ executives perceive higher degree of discretion (Carpenter and Golden, 1997). 
Thus, we argue that: 
H8: Assertiveness has a positive and significant relationship with managerial discretion 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 1 portrays our theoretical framework and identifies the relationships amid our 
variables. Each variable is expected to have a direct relationship (either positive or negative) 
with managerial discretion. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample of Countries 
Our sample consisted of Middle Eastern particularly Arab countries. This includes: Egypt, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar and United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
These countries constitute an overwhelming majority of top 100 publicly listed firms in the 
Arab World (Forbes Middle East, 2014). These nation-states have been heavily ignored by 
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previous research in the broader strategic management field. Besides, managerial discretion 
has not been studied in such business environments, which makes our attempt an interesting 
opportunity to discover new insights. More importantly, by using a different sample of 
countries, we provide construct validity to managerial discretion (Wangrow et al., 2015) and 
shed the light on new verdicts. 
Measures 
Dependent Variable: Managerial Discretion 
In empirical studies, so far, scholars have looked at theorized antecedents of discretion such 
as: organizational level antecedents including: sales, size, slack, R&D intensity, company 
structure, advertising intensity, volatility and firms’ strategic orientation (e.g. Boyd and 
Salamin, 2001; Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Kim, 2013; Quigley and Hambrick, 2012; 
Rajagopalan, 1997; Roth and O’Donnell, 1996). Others have used industry (or task 
environment) level variables such as: regulatory conditions, demand instability, market 
growth, product differentiability, attentional homogeneity and industry capital intensity (e.g. 
Datta and Rajagopalan, 1998; Finkelstein, 2009; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick 
and Quigley, 2014; Keegan and Kabanoff, 2008; Magnan and St-Onge, 1997; Peteraf and 
Reed, 2007). Another cluster of researchers employed individual executives’ characteristics 
measuring variables such as: locus of control, perception, commitment to the status quo, 
tenure, age, education and risk taking behavior (e.g. McClelland et al., 2010; Miller et al., 
1982; Roth, 1992). All these measures represent an indirect approach for assessing the degree 
of managerial discretion. These studies have preserved/treated discretion as a “black box”, 
whereby it was associated with various individual, organizational and/or industry specific 
variables. As Wangrow et al. (2015, p. 124) mentioned: “future research could 
pilot…industry experts, academics and managers to assess the level of discretion in 
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firms…and nations”. Such call represents a need to assess discretion in a direct manner 
without relying on proxy measures. 
Using expert panel rating, some scholars (e.g. Crossland and Hambrick, 2011; 
Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995) attempted to directly measure the degree of discretion. 
Expert panel, if appropriately chosen, provide consistent and valid assessments of 
organizational phenomena including business strategies (Snow and Hambrick, 1980), and 
strategic decision processes (Fredrickson, 1986). Notwithstanding, its probable perceptual 
bias, expert panel possesses an advantage for rating discretion directly and more closely than 
other measures. Additionally, the use of expert panel provides scores with minimum bias 
compared to other techniques. Panelists possess better knowledge in multiple contexts due to 
their exposure to several environments, and more importantly the relative objectivity of their 
answers (Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995). Following this direct technique, we sought 
discretion ratings from a panel of prominent cross-cultural scholars. 
Selection of Expert Panel 
We searched the social science citation index for recent studies (from 2008 to 2015) 
published in 3 and 4 stars’ business and management journals based on the Association of 
Business Schools’ Academic Journal Guide, with terms such as: “Cross-Cultural”, “Arab”, 
Middle-East”, “Arabian Countries”, “the Arab World”, “Arabic Culture” in titles, keywords 
and abstracts. The search resulted in 158 articles. Around hundred and thirty-seven scholars 
(panelists) have authored or co-authored at least two of these studies. Each panelist (scholar) 
has been contacted by electronic mail requesting his/her participation. If the recipient accepts 
to participate, he/she receives our survey by email and asked to give consent in order to 
complete the questionnaire. Before presenting the question, panelists were given a description 
about the project and the confidentiality consideration for their responses. Later, they have 
been provided with a brief explanation of managerial discretion based on Hambrick and 
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Finkelstein (1987) original description. Following Crossland and Hambrick (2011), we asked 
our panelists to rate on a 7 points Likert-scale, varying from ‘to a very small extent’ to ‘to a 
very large extent’, their perception of the degree of discretion provided to CEOs’ in Egypt, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar and United Arab Emirates. Of the 137 
panelists, 54 (32.4%) granted participation and provided utilizable responses. These scholars 
generated 262 ratings, with each country receiving between 38 and 50 ratings (overall mean 
of 43.67 scores per country). 
As these raters compromise the entire sample, and country discretion scores was rated 
by the same k panelists (Shrout and Fleiss, 1979), we computed ICC (3,k) to assess the inter-
rater reliability. The ICC (3,k) by consistency instead of agreement was computed as the 
survey question asked raters to make comparative rather than absolute judgments in regards 
to CEOs’ discretion in several countries (McGraw and Wong, 1996). ICC (3,k) coefficient 
was 0.86 indicating high inter-rater reliability (e.g. Chen et al., 1993; Taggar, 2002) and 
agreement of ratings among scholars (James, 1982). 
Independent Variables: Cultural Practices 
Consistent with earlier research (e.g. Basuil and Datta, 2015); we derived cultural dimensions 
scores from GLOBE cross-cultural model (House et al., 2004). GLOBE introduced two 
cultural measures for each dimension, values and practices. The former, what House et al. 
(2004) labeled ‘should be’, relates to the perception of respondents about cultural 
preferences, whereas, practices ‘as is’ relate to how people perceive the behavior of other 
members within a particular society. GLOBE distinction between values and practices has led 
to a better assessment of the cultural environment and overcome some of the limitations in 
other cross-cultural models (e.g. Hofstede). Scholars argue that Hofstede’s model suffer from 
homogenous sampling, time relevancy, corporate culture impact and factor structure 
problems (Orr and Hauser, 2008). Hofstede used only cultural values to operationalize 
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cultural dimensions. However, self-rating of values does not reflect national culture 
characteristics (Fischer, 2006). Such approach is accompanied with several problems (e.g. 
Bierbrauer et al., 1994; Oyserman et al., 2002) and yield ambiguous cross-cultural 
comparison (Heine et al., 2001). An alternative to that is asking individuals to rate behavior 
within a certain culture (e.g. Peterson and Fischer, 2004), by doing that individuals would be 
able to report on descriptive norms related to a particular society (Cialdini and Trost, 1998; 
Ehrhart and Naumann, 2004). These two methods differ significantly in their measurement of 
national culture. Self-rating eliminates the objectivity associated with assessing cultural 
norms (Fischer, 2006). In that sense people would subjectively rate cultural dimensions 
deeming their own individual preferences into consideration. On the other hand, if 
individuals rate how their collective behave this would therefore yield objective scores 
excluded from personal inclinations. As such respondents become observers of their own 
society. Therefore, we operationalize our independent variables using GLOBE practices 
scores for all countries except KSA, Lebanon and UAE. These countries were excluded in 
GLOBE sampling. In order to avoid using geographical proximity and have more accurate 
measures, we employed GLOBE Beta questionnaire and followed similar approach used by 
House et al. (2004). We identified five distinct industries: Fast Moving Consumer Goods, 
Medial Appliances and Equipment, Banking, Retail (Fashion and Accessories) and Real 
Estate and Construction. We approached middle managers of domestic firms (57 firms in 
total) operating in these industries. Participants had an average age between 30 to 34 years 
old, highly educated with majority (83.7%) having an undergraduate university degree or 
higher and have a position tenure of more than 3 years. Out of the 600 surveys sent, we 
received 375 completed and usable responses.  
Response Bias Procedure 
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Several authors in the cross-cultural literature have flagged a response bias problem when 
surveying individuals from different cultures (e.g. Stening and Everett, 1984; Triandis, 1994). 
Using mean scores for raw data will lead to problematic interpretation. We followed GLOBE 
response bias procedure and generated corrected scores for each cultural dimension. To 
assess the extent to which the importance that cultural-response bias play in this cultural 
scale, a bivariate correlation procedure was performed. The correlation between the 
uncorrected scores (raw data) and the corrected scores (unstandardized regression values) 
ranges from 0.84 to 0.94 with an average of 0.90. This correlation coefficient shows that the 
cultural response bias has a minor role in the present scale.  
Aggregation Verification, Reliability and Consistency 
 To verify the aggregation of individual scores to the societal level, we computed rwg (j) 
according to James et al. (1984). The average rwg (j) for our respondents was 0.80 indicating 
strong inter-rater agreement and larger reduction of error variance. This is higher than the 
traditional cut point of 0.70 (Lance et al., 2006; LeBreton et al., 2003). Also, we computed 
ICC (1) for all society cultural norms, which was 0.16. Such value indicates that only 16% of 
variance is attributable to between society differences. It is not surprising that with all the 
differences between the studied societies only 16% is related to variance between societies. 
Accordingly, these statistical measures strongly support and justify the aggregation of our 
respondents’ ratings to represent the society level. Furthermore, average Cronbach’s Alpha 
for the 375 participants was 0.88 indicating high internal consistency and strong relationship 
among the items constituting the scales used in this study.  Also, the average ICC (2) two-
way random effect measure (Shrout and Fleiss, 1979) was 0.96 suggesting a strong inter-rater 
reliability. Consequently, these results indicate that our study participants were highly 
reliable, consistent in their society ratings and provided valid responses to be used for society 
level of analysis.  
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Table I depicts mean managerial discretion and cultural practices scores for each 
country in our sample. 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
ANALYSIS 
In order to test the proposed hypotheses (1-9), we performed fixed-effect regression analysis 
in which country level discretion scores generated from the scholar panel were the dependent 
variables (262 diverse ratings), and culture scores were the independent variables. We used 
such technique because each scholar is distinct from the other in terms of the number of 
countries he/she rates and the tendency of his/her rating. Not all panelists provided scores for 
all countries and each gave distinct score (either low or high). Thus, fixed-effect regression in 
this context takes into account the inter-rater differences (Green, 1997) and treats each 
scholar as a fixed-effect. As opposed to ordinary least square (OLS), fixed-effect regression 
addresses the heterogeneity between raters along with controlling for the distinctive panelists’ 
rating pattern (Hsiao, 2003). This enables more accurate analysis that illustrates each scholar 
exclusive intercept and control for unobserved heterogeneity between raters (Kennedy, 2008, 
p. 282). 
FINDINGS 
Table II illustrates the bivariate correlations between discretion and the eight cultural 
practices. At this simple level and as illustrated below there exist some correlation between 
discretion and majority of the examined cultural practices. Such relationships indicate that 
cultural dimensions are not fully distinctive from each other and that they cohere in a way 
that suppresses statistical effects of individual dimension. For that reason, each variable was 
regressed against discretion ratings simultaneously. By doing that, we avoided the multi-
collinearity among the variables and illustrate solely each cultural dimension effect on 
discretion.  
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After running eight separate fixed-effect models, results are presented in Table III. 
We argued in Hypothesis 1 that the more that a society practices encourage collectivistic 
behavior the lower the discretion available to CEOs’ of firms’ headquartered in that society. 
Model (1) shows strong negative and significant relationship between institutional 
collectivism and managerial discretion (p<0.001), thus supporting H1. Model (2) which 
illustrates the relationship between uncertainty avoidance and managerial discretion, indicate 
a significant negative relationship (p<0.001) providing strong support for H2. H3, which 
postulates that higher power distance practices have a positive relationship with CEOs’ 
discretion, has been strongly supported as illustrated in Model (3) (p<0.001). As opposed to 
Crossland and Hambrick (2011), power distance in this contextual environment has yielded 
positive impact on managerial discretion. Moreover, H4, which argued that the more a 
society endorses future oriented behavior the higher the CEO discretion would be, was also 
supported as per Model (4) (p<0.05). Model (5) proves that the prediction concerning the 
impact of humane orientation practices on discretion was in the same hypothesized direction. 
This provides strong support for H5 (p<0.001), which contended that in societies where 
humane orientation behavior is promoted, CEOs’ would have lower leeway over their firms’ 
faith and form. H6 debated that the higher the performance orientation practices in a society 
the greater the CEO discretion would be. Model (6) proves this proposition (p<0.001). 
However, Model (7) exhibited opposite relationship. H7, which argues that the more that a 
society encourages equality among genders, the lower the discretion available to CEOs’ of 
firm headquartered in that society, shows contrasting outcomes. Indeed, the relationship is 
positive and strong (p<0.01), but in the opposite anticipated direction. Lastly, H8, which 
argued that the more a society values assertive behavior, the higher the discretion available to 
CEOs’ headquartered in that society, was positively supported as per Model (8), (p<0.001). 
INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE 
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INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE 
DISCUSSION 
In this study we drew on the institutional theory to depict that managerial discretion is not 
only a function of executive individualities, organizational and industry characteristics, but 
also dependent on the national culture. We assured that some countries enable executives to 
take idiosyncratic actions, whereas, others confer little latitude of actions. For nearly three 
decades focusing mainly on: the industry (e.g. Abrahamson and Hambrick, 1997; Finkelstein, 
2009; Hambrick and Quigley, 2014), organizational (e.g. Boyd and Salamin, 2001; Kim, 
2013) and individual (e.g. Carpenter and Golden, 1997; McClelland et al., 2010) contexts, we 
built upon Crossland and Hambrick (2011) framework and broadened the milieu in which 
executives matter. Our results extended the institutional framework of managerial discretion 
by unleashing the cover on new national-level antecedents that have a strong impact on CEO 
discretion. In an examination of six Middle Eastern countries, we found that an encompassing 
array of societal practices were significantly associated with the degree of discretion 
available to CEOs’ of public firms headquartered in these nation-states. A total of eight 
cultural practices exhibited high bivariate associations with discretion.  
While managerial discretion has indicated high context dependency, we observed that 
few cultural dimensions exhibited similar effect. Institutional collectivism and uncertainty 
avoidance were in the same direction of earlier findings. In this vein, we have been able to 
empirically validate the national-level construct of managerial discretion. More importantly, 
we extended the task environment and moved beyond the organizational direct competitive 
domain. Such effort, contributes toward enhancing the discretion concept and shifting the 
theory to a more mature level. We showed through our theoretical model that culture does not 
stop at individualism/collectivism and uncertainty avoidance dimensions, but also an 
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important collection of other cultural constructs play a fundamental role in influencing the 
degree of leeway executive can have.  
Findings provided strong support for our hypotheses that cultural dimension play a 
crucial role in shaping CEO discretion. But more importantly, these results are consistent 
with the tenets of institutional theory and previous discretion studies. We demonstrated that 
societies high on power distance, future and performance orientation, gender egalitarianism 
and assertiveness provide CEOs’ with greater latitude of actions. However, countries high on 
institutional collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and humane orientation limit CEOs’ 
discretion. Although Crossland and Hambrick (2011) found a negative relationship between 
power distance and managerial discretion, our findings demonstrated the contrary. Societies 
that appreciate and encourage inequality amongst its members, accord executives more status 
and privilege. In such cultural environments, executives are not accorded with high status as 
a form of emotional compensation (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011), rather they exert the 
power assigned to them and enjoy wider array of actions to be implemented. Because, 
subordinates are not able to confer higher hierarchical decisions, CEOs’ are afforded with 
enough discretion to take bold and idiosyncratic actions. These societies tend to romanticize 
leaders (Krull et al., 1999) and by doing that these latter would be able to exert power and 
take subjective decisions. Again this redirects to the context in which discretion is studied. In 
Middle Eastern countries, executives in position of power exert and continuously seek to 
enlarge the gap with their subordinates. In contrast, European and Anglo American countries 
may not experience the same hierarchical power. As per Crossland and Hambrick (2011), 
these collectives accord executives status and respect but perceive them as figureheads rather 
than bold decisions-makers. 
Furthermore, we failed to find empirical support for our proposition concerning the 
relationship between gender egalitarianism and managerial discretion. We argued that 
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masculine societies, which appreciate results and competition over collaboration and 
solidarity, provide greater discretion to CEOs’. We anticipated a negative relationship 
between gender equality and discretion; however, our findings indicate the opposite. In fact, 
the bivariate correlation was strong and positive. There is no obvious or explicit explanation 
for this, however an intriguing possibility is that societies that accord women more status try 
to expand stakeholder’s zone of acceptance. In other words, when female achieve higher 
positions in a certain society, people will broaden their attitude toward gender differences and 
will tolerate or accept others within the same environment. By doing that, societies are 
expanding their zone of acceptance in terms of behavior and practices generated from another 
societal group. In that case, seeing females in position of CEOs’ would not be objectionable 
and accordingly will have similar discretion as their male counterparts. For instance, the 
greatest number of women reaching the chief executive position is from high discretion 
countries such as the US. Perhaps gender equality makes people more acceptable of others 
and in such way; the stakeholder’s ‘zone of acceptance’ becomes larger. Another possible 
explanation can come from the process of breaking the ‘glass ceiling’ and reaching the CEO 
position. Ragins and colleagues (1998) in a survey of fortune 1,000 CEOs’ illustrated the 
various strategies women implement in order to reach the top. One of those strategies is 
developing a similar style and attitude as their men equivalents. That being said, societies that 
tolerate equality between genders might not envision the stereotype differences when having 
women in high position, thus will provide them with similar discretion. Although, there is no 
evidence or support for such explanation, it is an interesting likelihood. 
Research Contributions and Limitations 
Our study has answered the question of when executives matter from a national perspective. 
We reaffirm that CEOs’ are able to pursue idiosyncratic, bold and deviant strategies only in 
countries where cultural practices allow them to do so. Therefore, we were able to validate 
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Crossland and Hambrick (2011) propositions in relation to individualism and uncertainty 
avoidance in new cross-cultural contexts. However, by empirically testing the impact of 
power distance on discretion, we confirm its positive relationship and contradict previous 
findings. Despite the context dependency of managerial discretion, the relationship exhibited 
between discretion and individualism/collectivism and uncertainty avoidance cultural norms 
contradicted this assertion. Thus, it could be argued that these cultural norms are universal in 
their effect on managerial discretion. Additionally, by substantially examining the national-
level manifestations of managerial discretion, we have discovered new national-level 
antecedents. By doing so, we broadened the scope of managerial discretion by assessing its 
indicators in new, non-western cross-cultural contexts. Finally, another useful contribution is 
the development of a robust and more reliable expert panel that allows better 
operationalization of managerial discretion. 
Results presented in this paper could shed the light on a variety of cross-cultural 
differences. For instance, national-level of managerial discretion could have an important 
implication on the CEO appointment process. Despite relying on the national pool (DiNardo 
et al., 1996), CEO labor market in our current globalized world could be affected by the 
cross-national differences in managerial discretion. For instance, transferring a CEO from 
low to a high discretion country may lead to substantial negative effects on firm performance. 
CEOs’ in high discretion countries are used to take bold strategic actions that do not 
necessarily comply with the overall cultural norms. When such CEO moves to a low 
discretion setting, implementing idiosyncratic actions is objectionable, thus any decisions that 
deviate from the cultural boundaries will lead to negative results on firm performance.  
Also, discretion might have an important implication on several other strategic 
decisions. As executives in low discretion environments have fewer sets of strategic actions, 
there may be high tendency towards discarding significant strategic initiatives (e.g. large 
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merger and acquisitions). In such environments, executives tend to focus more on 
implementing symbolic actions based on market signaling. Moreover, discretion could play 
an important factor/indicator for cross-border merger and acquisitions failure or success (e.g. 
Daimler and Chrysler case). Another important implication of cross-national differences in 
managerial discretion is the explanation of the variation in terms of competitive dynamism. 
Porter and colleagues (2000) argued that Japanese firms (low discretion country) are 
homogenous in their strategic orientation. As such, firms in low discretion countries might be 
more homogenous in terms of their strategic orientation, whereas firms in high discretion 
environments may well foresee differentiation strategies. 
Similar to any other study, our paper has some limitations. We tested our hypothesis 
using a small/moderate size sample of countries. We restricted our sample to countries 
containing the largest firms in the Arab world; this has resulted in omitting other Arabian and 
Middle Eastern countries (e.g. Turkey, Jordan, Bahrain, Oman, etc.) which also have an 
important financial/business power in that region. Similar to what we have done, future work, 
should consider broadening the geographical scope of managerial discretion. Additionally, 
we explored the nature and antecedents of managerial discretion at the national-level but its 
consequences were beyond the scope of our study. As stated in Crossland and Hambrick 
(2011), is high discretion a good thing. Cross-cultural scholars argue that culture has an 
impact on the economic development of countries (e.g. House et al., 2004). As such, what is 
the role of managerial discretion in economic development? Does high discretion lead to 
better economic performance, or does it harm the economic development of countries? 
Researchers are encouraged to consider such link in future attempts.  
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